Introduction
European Union institutions are increasingly adopting soft law instruments. While the number of these instruments has increased, the trend is not novel by any means. In 1992 the European Council convened in Edinburgh. The meeting took place in the context of widespread concern for the legitimacy of Community action, and the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity seemed just right to work out the situation. Alongside these fundamental principles, non-binding instruments were promoted as tools to regulate according to those principles. The conclusions set out the premise that the principle of proportionality implies that non-binding tools such as recommendations should, when appropriate, be privileged over binding instruments and thus due consideration should be given to the use of voluntary codes of conduct. 2 One main characteristic of new governance is increased flexibility and revisability in the form of soft law.
3 Soft law form is believed to contribute to flexibility and diversity at Member State level. The introduction of a soft policy coordination instrument, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) which is now the most prominent new governance method, is believed to 'foster convergence on common interest and on some agreed common priorities while respecting national and regional diversities. It is an inclusive method for deepening European construction'. 4 The number of scholars that hail soft law as a way to protect national diversities in a range of Europeanised policy fields has accordingly increased in recent years. For instance, Trubek et al write that soft law can give consideration to divergent national circumstances 'through flexible implementation', which gives Member States leeway to adapt European norms to national economic and social contexts. 5 The Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making when discussing the use of alternative methods of regulation provides that these mechanisms are not 'applicable where fundamental rights or important political options are at stake or in situations where the rules must be applied in a uniform fashion in all Member States' (author's own emphasis). 6 The message seems to be that soft law is good because it safeguards national autonomy.
These accounts of soft law are founded upon the formal distinction between hard law and soft law: soft law is non-binding, i.e. the EUinstitutions are not able to invoke their claim for supremacy in relation to non-binding instruments. This feature then guarantees freedom of action for Member States. In practice, the autonomy of Member States is circumscribed in many ways. Despite the existence of such a formal difference between hard law and soft law, soft law has legal effects that throw the flexibility and diversity associated with nonbinding instruments into serious doubt. Legal effects are manifold and diverse, but they give rise to four considerations. These are documented below with detailed examples.
First, soft law can be seen transforming into hard law, and as a result closing down legislative flexibility, due to judicial recognition, particularly through the case law of the European courts. Second, legal effect is generated by expectations laid out in soft law instruments. Flexibility of national action is restrained by explicit terms of soft law instruments, which demand special types of national implementing measures, or information or accountability mechanisms put in place. The third distinctive category is the role taken by the Commission to cooperate with non-state actors at national level, thus giving effect to soft law provisions. Fourth, soft law may be incorporated into hard law provisions. Soft law becomes institutionalised in the EUlegal framework, and as a result actors pay less attention to a rule's institutional source, or the so-called 'pedigree' of a norm.
Considering this categorisation, it does not seem very helpful to talk of soft law within the framework of a binary distinction between hard and soft law. Instead, the need arises for a new approach, which shifts our attention to emerging institutional and legal linkages between EUinstitutions and Member States, which is attentive to the significant role played by non-state actors, and to hybrid forms of regulatory instruments comprising soft and hard law provisions. Conceptualising soft law in these terms prevents us from making the mistake of assuming that it will, by default, promote flexibility and diversity. On the contrary, soft law can be an effective way of achieving integration in areas where Member States are sensitive to common provisions, and hard law initiatives are simply not possible. 
The Concept of Soft Law: Descriptive and Normative Problems
Soft law is an umbrella concept that is often captured by way of a negation, contrasting the concept with the notion of hard law. Hard law in the European Union arises from treaties, regulations, and the Community method, 7 normally taking the form of regulations, directives, and decisions (Article 288 TFEU, ex Article 249 EC). European hard law is described as having binding legal force, generating general and external effects, and being adopted by EUinstitutions according to a specific procedure and a specified legal basis in the Treaties. 8 In contrast, soft law is understood to refer to rules of conduct that are not legally binding as such but may have practical and legal effects.
9 This categorisation offers a starting point to develop my argument in this article. Lawyers tend to attach the concept to law-like rules, which are not legally binding per se, such as recommendations and opinions (Article 288(5) TFEU, ex Article 249(3) EC). Other comparable instruments, such as communications, notices, and guidelines are also regarded as soft law, though often without a legal basis in the Treaties. Indeed, no generic legal basis exists on which soft law is adopted, nor does any set of institutional actors exist that are primarily responsible for adopting soft law instruments. In any event, it is EUinstitutions, often the Commission, that adopt soft law. This tendency is so pervasive that in some accounts EUsoft law is considered 'non-binding governmental' rules.
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For political scientists, legal bindingness is a less important concept. They often speak of soft law in terms of the flexibility, revisability, and heterarchy of a regulatory instrument. Political science has, for instance, used the concept of soft law in analysing the domestic implications of the European Employment Strategy, the Open Method of Coordination adopted in relation to European employment policies.
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Whilst no single definition of soft law can be specified, soft law is increasingly being assessed from a joint perspective. New governance research, which provides a shared framework for legal as well as political science scholars to discuss the phenomenon of governance that perhaps is familiar to them under different headings, 12 allows for a collective approach to soft law, further integrating non-bindingness with the ideals of flexibility and diversity.
At the core, at least, of the legal conception of soft law lies the difference between legal bindingness and legal effects. The simple way to differentiate between them is to say that legally binding force means that a regulatory instrument could be ultimately enforced by means of legal sanctions. of legal bindingness plays a significant role in the transposition of directives, for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has held that in order to guarantee possible subjective rights, directives must be transposed by binding instruments, which usually denotes legislation. The requirement of a binding instrument is there to guarantee that individuals can enforce their rights through national courts if need be. 13 By contrast, legal effects of soft law refer to the potential of soft law instruments to create legitimate expectations for individuals or businesses, or to clarify and specify the terms of hard law.
This article covers a wide range of measures that are not formally binding but have legal effects, beginning with instruments covered under Article 288(5) TFEU, ex Article 249(3) EC), explanatory documents accompanying legally binding instruments, policy-making in the framework of the OMC, and also bodies of rules established by non-state actors. Instead of attempting to offer a more rigorous categorisation, the article seeks to distinguish legal effects of soft law instruments on Member State practices in light of multiple evidence on non-binding instruments. Before doing so, I shall briefly illustrate how legal effects are categorised in the existing research.
Soft law is traditionally viewed in the shadow of legislation. Soft law as a relation to legislation is also elaborated in Senden's following categorisation.
14 First, soft law can announce hard legislation. When soft law is adopted with a view to its being 'upgraded' into a binding instrument at some point in the future, it operates as a precursor to legislation (pre-law). Endowed with this task, a non-binding instrument activates Member States and stake-holders, disseminates and communicates information to governmental and nongovernmental bodies, and collates data on the basis of which the optimal regulatory instrument can be chosen. Now that soft law paves the way for hard legislation, it is hardly in Member State's interests to disregard a soft law instrument on the basis of its non-bindingness. Member States may not only want to be involved in legislative negotiations in order to propose amendments or omissions, but also in order to remove the proposed instrument from the agenda altogether, as they did in the following instance. The Commission proposed introduction of a novel regulatory model in the context of corporate governance. The idea was to assemble a forum consisting of experts to adopt soft law provisions that were to be to put together as the European Code on Corporate Governance. The proposal was withdrawn after strong opposition from Member States. 15 Second, soft law can be intended to elaborate the terms of legislation (postlaw). For instance, in competition law the Commission regularly adopts communications that are aimed at clarifying the interpretation of a set of relevant norms for national authorities and businesses. Existing norms may simply be restated but new rules can also be given that are not necessarily inherent to the existing legal framework. At times this function may also hide the institution's choice of soft law prompted mainly by a desire to avoid application of competence provisions. Finally, soft law can be a real alternative to legislation (para-law). Sometimes, soft law is needed only as a temporary solution prior to legislation. For example, it is quite common to see complex issues channelled for decision outside the legislative process. Member States opt for soft instruments in order to avoid deadlocks in negotiations and to circumvent 'real', hard law obligations. 16 Similarly, the existence of 27 Member States makes decisionmaking cumbersome, so that soft law then becomes the price of agreement. Sometimes, however, it is a proper alternative, establishing or giving further effect to Union objectives with a desire to manage closer cooperation between Member States or the approximation of laws in a non-binding way.
A soft law act fulfilling a para-law function goes with the recognition of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Following the Edinburgh Summit, the principles were subsequently attached as a form of protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The protocol does not mention non-legislative instruments but by the beginning of the 21st century alternative regulatory methods had gained prominence. The Commission's White Paper on European Governance in 2001 and numerous better regulation policy documents have attempted to increase the use of soft law as a way of increasing the legitimacy of EUaction in the eyes of EUcitizens. Soft law form facilitates common policy-making without making too many inroads into the Member States, whilst maintaining an adequate margin for joint action. It is this type of soft law that concerns us most; hence it is tacitly assumed that non-bindingness will be translated into flexibility and diversity at national level.
However, flexibility and diversity are constrained beyond the binary distinction between hard law and soft law by a host of extra-legislative elements that go apparently unrecognised by this distinction. Senden's categorisation builds upon the binary distinction, and for this reason it can not capture all those ways in which soft law restricts and curtails Member State choices. I now turn to four concrete examples in order to elaborate the relative 'bindingness' of legal effects of soft law, closing down the legal and political flexibility attempted through the choice of soft law. 
Making Sense of Legal Effects of Soft Law

The European Courts giving Effect to Soft Law: Transforming Soft Law into Hard Law?
Legal research has long argued that the ECJ's cautiously positive attitude towards the use of soft law acts has not only contributed to their overall quantity in the EU, but has also rendered them a significant part of the acquis communautaire. The landmark case is no doubt the Grimaldi judgment that obligated national courts to take recommendations into consideration when deciding on disputes submitted to them, despite the fact that recommendations have no binding force according to Article 288(5) TFEU(ex Article 249(3) EC). 17 The ECJ was silent on the potential breadth of the obligation but has at times itself referred to a line of interpretation included in a soft law instrument.
18 This is even more likely to happen in cases concerning the institutional dynamics between the Commission and the European courts. In the area of postal services, the Commission guidelines, even if de lege ferenda, formed part of the overall legal framework, which could be taken into account in assessing whether the Commission was making appropriate use of its limited resources.
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In keeping with increasing recognition of soft law instruments, the European courts have taken an approach that limits the discretion of EUinstitutions to depart from soft law instruments. When soft law instruments are published, they will apply and have legal effects. In turn, this means that the institution in question cannot deviate from them without risk of being found to be in breach of general principles of law, such as equal treatment or protection of legitimate expectations. Member State's acceptance of the rules laid down in the guidelines during cooperation, the ECJ held that a Member State must apply the guidelines when deciding on an application for a particular state aid. The European courts maintain that under certain conditions and depending on their content, soft law instruments may have legal effects. It is important to remember that the European courts are slightly biased towards finding legal effect, because legal effect is a precondition for the courts' competence to declare an action admissible. Only when the courts have established whether a measure adopted by the institutions, whatever its nature or form, is intended to have legal effects, can they subject the measure to an action for annulment.
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These legal effects may, as we have seen, provide a framework for assessing the activities of the Commission, or require Member States to apply certain guidelines in administrative decision-making. Where is the origin of legal effect? In some cases the courts have invoked the treaty-analogy: soft law acts derive their legal effects from the underlying agreement. This argument can only go so far: it applies to decisions which are taken unanimously on the basis of the consent of each participant involved in decision-making but it seems to fall short of explaining why a decision taken by the majority could bind those who abstain from voting or vote against it. Just as puzzling are those instruments that derive from Commission practice. 23 One way to solve the conundrum is to insist on the purpose of soft law as being to clarify hard law instruments: soft law comes with legal effect as far as it serves 'the enforcement of certain superior principles of law' that are common both to the European legal order and national legal orders. 24 This makes significant demands on the courts to review soft law instruments in their legislative and legal context. Sometimes the task is relatively undemanding. In France v. Commission, the Commission tried to impose a directive proposal, which had not been agreed upon in the Council, as a form of a communication called 'Interpretative communication on the internal market for pension funds'. This communication was an unaltered version of a directive proposal that concerned certain investment obligations on pension funds. The ECJ annulled the communication, arguing that the communication was not confined to explaining the Treaty provisions, but intended to lay down obligations with which Member States must comply. It was thus intended to have legal effects The European courts make abundantly clear that those soft law provisions intended to have legal effects distinct from those provided by the Treaty or secondary legislation provisions are at risk of being found to be in breach of general principles of law. 27 This reflects the principle of legal certainty, which is part of the EUlegal order, and which requires EUlegislation to be clear and its application to be foreseeable to all interested parties. However, once it is established that soft law acts do not have legal effects of their own, as distinct from those of secondary legislation, or indeed of the Treaties, then those legal effects become somewhat indistinguishable from what counts as binding force. In other words, in some cases soft law instruments are interpreted in rather binding terms. In Case C-325/91, the ECJ stated that 'any act intended to have legal effects must derive its binding force from a provision of Community law which prescribes the legal form to be taken by that act and which must be expressly indicated therein as its legal basis, failing which the act in question will be null and void' (author's own emphases). 28 It seems that Klabbers is right to postulate that as soon as soft law is applied in any circumstances, be they judicial or state practices, the concept 'collapses' into hard law, or to no law whatsoever. 29 Indeed, he concludes that the concept of soft law is redundant. Similarly, Snyder has suggested that soft law becomes hard by judicial recognition. 30 Österdahl gives a concrete example of 'hardening' in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which, in her view, hardened due to judicial recognition. 31 The existence of this mechanism has been disputed in recent research on competition soft law in European courts. Stefan argues that the case law of the European courts in fact reflects the distinction between legally binding force and legal effects: it attaches legal effects to non-binding instruments only when this facilitates the enforcement of particular superior principles of law, common to the European legal order and the national legal orders.
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Does this understanding of soft law translate into flexibility at Member State level? It is certain that the relative weight of a soft law instrument continues to vary from case to case. However, although we might not accept the hardening thesis, it seems safe to assume that a particular soft law instrument appears hugely credible and influential in the eyes of Member States, if introduced in a context where the obligation to apply the norms arises from general principles of law, not from soft law instruments themselves.
Implementation Clauses in Soft Law Instruments: the Institutional Origins of Soft Law Creating Legal Effects
Soft law enhances the scope and intensity of EUintegration. This is particularly true of non-binding instruments that are adopted in the event of no consensus over, or desire for, legislation, or when formal legislative competence to proceed with a policy proposal is lacking though some sort of steering is considered necessary. Steering soft law instruments functions as an alternative ('para') to hard law, particularly in areas where Member States are known to be more sensitive to common provisions and where hard law initiatives may be blocked. Inherent in steering instruments that aim to establish closer cooperation or approximation of laws through informality and non-bindingness is their aspirational nature: a domestic change is aspired to and aimed for.
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Now that informality and non-bindingness are the defining characteristics, EUinstitutions' efforts to influence and convince Member States seem to be far more important than those intended simply to command and control.
There is a familiar assumption that national measures intended to introduce EUsoft law acts are clearly voluntary yet beneficial for Member States. Soft law instruments often hide the Commission's interest in pursuing legislative reform in the field. Indeed, Member State indifference to soft law acts may cost them information that could help them anticipate political issues which will appear later on the agenda. From a normative point of view, it is convenient to refer to the principle of loyal cooperation (Article 4(3) TFEU, ex Article 10 TEU) in order to explain why we would expect to see any Member State activity. In Senden's view the provision cannot be considered to impose general obligations to comply with soft law instruments without further hard law provisions. Though in careful words, she formulates that a negative obligation may have a wider scope of application and in any event the Member States should, where discernible common interests exist, 'refrain from taking measures that go against the few Community rules', even if those rules are merely soft law provisions.
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The principle of loyal cooperation and how it is interpreted in the literature becomes at least partly questionable in the light of the firm language adopted in soft law instruments, often the Commission's. Without recourse to enforceable legal obligations, steering instruments intended to approximate national legislation often 'mimic the language and norms of formal legal instruments ', 35 so that Member States will at least feel constrained to give a reason for failure to transpose or comply with them yet calling into question the flexibility and diversity provided by those instruments. 36 For instance, the Commission Recommendation on the role of nonexecutive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board is written in the form of an expectation: 'With a view to fostering the role of non-executive or supervisory directors, it is therefore appropriate that all Member States be invited to take the steps necessary to introduce at national level a set of provisions based on the principles set out in this Recommendation, to be used by listed companies either on the basis of the 'comply or explain' approach or pursuant to legislation'. 37 The Commission imposes a direct regulatory task on Member States to make sure that the principles enshrined in the Recommendation are duly ('appropriately') observed at national level. The Recommendation also sets the deadline by which Member States must notify the Commission of the measures taken in accordance with the Recommendation 'in order to enable the 34 39 However, Article 5 of the Recommendation reads that Member States 'should take measures' to limit liability, enumerating immediately below three methods in particular to be used.
Another example concerns the European Code of Conduct for Mediators. As an early concrete policy instrument in the area of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), the draft Code of Conduct was published on 6 April 2004. Officially it was adopted on 2 July 2004. In the explanatory statement to the Code, the Commission states that the Code expresses a number of principles to which individual mediators can voluntarily commit. 40 Similarly, organisations that provide ADR services can also make a commitment. The list of committed organisations involves 84 names at the time of writing. 41 The Code was drawn up by a working group including representatives from mediation groups, the legal profession, industry specialists, and consumer groups working together with the Commission. Official national representation was not involved. Although the Code enjoys the support of the Commission, the Commission has pointed out that the Code does not represent its official position. Instead it has been explained as the Justice Directorate's way of reinforcing a self-regulatory attitude to ADR by the ADR community. Adherence to the code is without prejudice to national legislation or rules regulating individual professions.
Despite these flexibility-reinforcing characteristics, the Code of Conduct seems to be endowed with the expectation that complementary national measures will be introduced. in the C Series of the Official Journal of the European Union as a notice without legal effects'.
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Soft law aimed to approximate national provisions in a non-binding fashion is likely to need national (governmental) measures in order to meet its aims effectively. However, the underlying goal of soft law to facilitate flexibility in terms of respective national measures falls short of our expectations and assumptions. As we realised, it is not unlikely that the Commission would recommend that it is 'appropriate' for Member States to adopt a set of provisions to introduce soft law norms, and to set deadlines on which Member States are 'invited' to inform the Commission of actions taken in the light of a particular soft law instrument. Flexibility is restrained by the explicit terms of soft law instruments, which, whilst recognising the importance of Member States being able to choose the most suitable regulatory instrument, make inroads into Member State autonomy by limiting the choice of options available to national policy-makers, or demanding that a particular type of information be submitted to EUinstitutional actors. It is of course unlikely, and indeed unrealistic to assume, that Member States will simply restate soft law provisions, but efforts to guarantee a particular outcome are probably far more common than we have come to realise. 
The Important Role of Non-state Actors in giving Effect to Soft Law and Beyond
Many new governance mechanisms embrace a variety of actors and the broader dynamics of inclusion. The inclusion of various stakeholders, from experts to the public, is believed to contribute to the democratic legitimacy of decisionmaking at EUlevel, making them at least feel ownership of decisions they have had a voice in making. Non-state (private) actors can fill many roles. I will not analyse their role in rule-making more generally but will rather focus upon the relevance of nonstate actors in giving effect to EUsoft law in Member States. Surely, non-state actors that have themselves adopted soft law norms, or influenced their 43 The Community institutions have repeatedly voiced concern over the impact of soft law on domestic law, and ultimately on legal integration. The European Parliament identified the development towards framework directives and codes of conduct as harmful, leading to law which is 'uncertain, less binding ('soft law') and less secure'. Such law will then 'result in artificial harmonization and random transposition of provisions into national legislation'. Some vagueness is apparent as to the status and legal effects of agreements left to be implemented informally, by the social partners themselves. According to one observer, they 'do not have another legal status other than that of an agreement between two parties falling outside the scope of Community law'. 45 This conclusion seems to stand in contrast to normative and empirical insights. First, the EC Treaty provides a specific legal basis for implementation of agreements in accordance with 'the procedures and practices specific to management and labour in the Member States'. Second, informal though these procedures and practices may appear, it is possible to argue that they have an added value to the Europeanisation of labour laws in Member States.
Professional organisations are another group of non-state actors who may well have (vested) interests in supporting a piece of soft law at national level. Some evidence exists to support the conclusion that national professional organisations use EU soft law as a means of setting minimum standards at national level. This is a way for professional organisations to protect and enhance their reputation. For instance, domestic mediation organisations can make available information on the measures they are taking to support respect for the European Code of Conduct by individual mediators through such measures as training, evaluation, and monitoring. Consumer organisations have also shown interest in developing similar measures. The European Consumers' Organisation suggested in its comment to the draft version of the Code of Conduct for Mediators that provisions should be added at a later stage relating to implementation, compliance, and monitoring aspects of the code. 46 Whilst for professional and non-professional organisations EU soft law acts primarily provide a cogent way to establish a reputation, active domestic civil society can also contribute to the convergence of different national practices, and indeed, the Europeanisation of respective policy areas.
In the UK, the central actor in the area of mediation is the Civil Mediation Council. This is a neutral body of civil society, established to represent providers of civil and commercial mediation services. The Civil Mediation Council's pilot accreditation scheme requires those seeking accreditation to comply with a suitable Code of Conduct, and they particularly recommend the EUCode. The actual wording is '(1) An Accredited Mediation Provider must have an appropriate written Code of Conduct for its members to follow, (2) That written code must be no less rigorous than the EUModel Code of Conduct for Mediators published in 2004'. 47 Likewise, the Scottish Mediation Network (SMN) has launched a register for mediators, and one of the requirements for being on the Register is adherence to a Code of Conduct: 'As a minimum the mediator shall practice in accordance with the Scottish Mediation Register's Guidelines for the Practice of Mediation in Scotland being consistent with the European Union Model Code of Conduct for Mediators or such other code that accepts the SMN Guidelines as a minimum'.
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Member States are no longer monolithic regulatory units. Quite the opposite, they are characterised by extensive fragmentation encompassing divergent objectives and orientations, and one set of objects and aims pursued by professional or commercial actors is naturally dissimilar to those pursued for instance by governmental actors. Viewed this way, national professional organisations, and civil society at large, can provide a significant avenue for EU institutions to influence domestic actors and agenda-setting more broadly, at least where common interests exist.
These examples have dealt with instances in which private actors have had a strong role in establishing bodies of rules. Can non-state actors occupy a role in giving effect to soft law without necessarily being involved in its adoption? To the extent that active civil society is designed to ensure that Member States fulfill their implementation obligations, it could be argued that we should attempt to enhance the interplay between the Commission and private actors. For instance, non-state actors could be encouraged to report to the Commission any flaws, or inaction they perceive in implementation of soft policy coordination instruments, particularly the OMC. It has become clear that the Commission lacks material resources, or indeed a legal basis, to monitor Member States effectively in implementing a particular OMC. This has led scholars to argue that the OMC 'is not good' for the EU. It would not be out of the question to mobilise stakeholders to monitor national measures intended to put into practice the aims of the OMC. Of course, the effectiveness of this kind of informal monitoring depends on the degree of participation non-state actors are entitled to in policy-and rulemaking and how transparent national administration is. In the best-case scenario, relevant stakeholders are well equipped to monitor realisation of OMC targets at national level.
Incorporation of Soft Law into Hard Law: Hybrid Forms of Regulatory Instruments
We have so far focused mainly on the institutional and legal context that limits discretion of Member States in relation to soft law norms. Flexibility of national action can also be curtailed by including soft law as part of hard law instruments. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which incorporates national codes of conduct so as to render them virtually binding, is illuminating. 50 Its Article 6 determines conditions on which a commercial practice is considered misleading. The second point says that commercial practice shall also be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances, it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise', and it involves: … '(b) non-compliance by the trader with commitments contained in codes of conduct by which the trader has undertaken to be bound, where: (i) the commitment is not aspirational but is firm and is capable of being verified, and (ii) the trader indicates in a commercial practice that he is bound by the code.
The Directive transforms what are essentially voluntary codes of conduct binding on traders. 51 The Directive not only aims to make traders bound by national codes of conduct; it also attempts to indirectly influence their substantive content. It is hoped in the preamble that by strengthening the role of national codes of conduct in regulating traders' professional behaviour, professional organisations incorporate the principles of the Directive in national codes of conduct, and hence 'enable traders to apply the principles of the Directive effectively in specific economic fields'. Many examples exist of embedded soft law provisions in environmental directives, limiting choices available to Member States. For instance, in January 2005 the EUlaunched the Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EUETS) as the largest multi-country, multi-sector Greenhouse Gas emission trading scheme world-wide. The scheme is based on Directive 2003/87/EC, which entered into force in 2003. Article 14 of the Directive concerns guidelines for monitoring and reporting emissions. The Commission is given the responsibility of adopting guidelines for monitoring and reporting emissions resulting from the activities listed in Annex I of greenhouse gases specified in relation to those activities. 53 Member States must ensure that emissions are monitored in accordance with the guidelines. In addition, Member States have to ensure that each operator of an installation reports emissions from that installation during each calendar year to the competent authority in accordance with the guidelines.
Another example is more complex. Directive 2008/1/EC pertains to integrated pollution prevention and control (the IPPC directive). 54 The permit can be issued only if certain environmental obligations are complied with. The obligations must be based on Best Available Techniques (BAT), defined as using established techniques which are the most effective in achieving a high level of environmental protection and which can be implemented in the relevant sector in accordance with economically and technically viable conditions, taking into account costs and benefits of doing so. An information exchange on BAT is organised by the Commission together with Member States and other stakeholders to establish BAT reference documents (BREFs) indicating what is considered as BAT at EUlevel for each industrial sector.
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Final responsibility for publication of BAT reference documents rests with the Commission.
The aim of a BAT reference document is to offer information to the competent authorities of Member States, businesses, the Commission, and the public to guide the determination of BAT-based permit conditions. BAT reference documents are non-binding, and EUinstitutions prefer to emphasise 53 The guidelines are to be based on the principles for monitoring and reporting set out in Annex IV. However, reference documents are likely to be hugely influential in the implementation process, particularly in Member States that cannot devote a large amount of resources to environmental regulation, and which are likely to be the same Member States that do not enjoy a strong bargaining position in negotiating the documents. 57 The potential influence of BAT reference documents is even more evident in the light of possible reasons to strengthen and make the use of reference documents more frequent. The Commission noted in its proposal for an IPPC Directive that significant imbalances and shortcomings exist in the implementation of best available techniques because of the unclear provisions on BAT in the current legislation, the degree of flexibility bestowed upon competent authorities to deviate from reference documents when issuing permits, and the vague role of BAT reference documents. As a result, the Commission continued, permits issued for implementing the Directive often contain conditions that are not based on BAT as described in the BREFs. This again has resulted in poor delivery of the environmental benefits originally intended, and distortions in the internal market. 58 In order to deal effectively with these shortcomings, the proposal laid down several provisions to strengthen and clarify the use of BAT. For instance, it was suggested that BAT reference documents be the reference for setting permit conditions, and that emission limit values set by the competent authority do not exceed emission levels associated with the best available techniques as described in those BAT reference documents (Articles 15-16). The latter provision would in fact acknowledge the binding force of BREFS on Member States.
Although the revision process is still underway, reference documents are going to have considerable scientific and political, if not necessarily legal, authority, and it is likely that Member States will at least feel obliged to explain why they have have not complied with them. 59 However, Article 3, which requires Member States to 'take the necessary measures to provide that the competent authorities ensure that installations are operated in such a way that: a) all the appropriate preventive measures are taken against pollution, in particular through application of the best available techniques', may provide the Commission with the legal authority it needs to limit national discretion in implementation. With respect to the original IPC Directive the Commission said that it saw the 'BAT reference notes' in IPPC as the point of departure for enforcement.
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Conclusions
The use of non-binding instruments, soft law, has proliferated in the EUduring the last two decades. Two main reasons appear to explain the rise of soft law instruments: lack of formal legislative competence to adopt hard law provisions, and the desire to guarantee flexibility and diversity of national action. Focusing on the latter argument, we have come to realise the 'Edinburgh heritage' of soft law, an idea which has enormously contributed to the role adopted by soft law in the EU: soft law is useful because it preserves Member State autonomy. Since the 1992 Edinburgh Summit, legal integration coupled with binding instruments has been demonstrated as a form of suppressing cultural and political diversity whereas non-binding laws have been promoted as a way to advance legal integration without interfering too much with the autonomy of Member States, while retaining a necessary margin for common manoeuvres. Unlike European hard laws, which at the extreme require that a potential national conflicting norm be disapplied in order to give effect to a supranational law, soft law does not have the same effect, thus guaranteeing flexibility and diversity of national action. More recently, soft law has become associated with new governance research. It also emphasises the potential of soft law to contribute to flexibility and diversity.
This article concludes that it does not seem very helpful to talk of soft law by stressing the binary distinction between hard and soft law, binding and nonbinding. Soft law might be 'less binding' but we should exercise enormous caution in judging flexibility and diversity prominently in terms of the relative bindingness of a regulatory instrument. Instead, a need exists for research, which is attentive to hybrid forms of instrument composed of soft and hard law provisions, and which shifts our attention to emerging administrative and legal linkages between national and EUlevel actors. Finally, research should seek to unearth and understand the role played by non-state actors. These factors evidently reinforce each other: for instance, explicit terms of soft law instruments, which demand particular types of information to be submitted to EUinstitutional actors, may also facilitate non-state actors in tapping into information that might not otherwise be easily available.
For this reason we need to analyse soft law instruments within a framework which takes into account the legal and institutional context, as well as the substantive and procedural flexibility provided by its norms, before concluding that soft law serves the objectives of flexibility and diversity. Besides a more holistic approach, research should analyse soft law in a more case-specific manner in order to fully grasp the implications of the choice of soft law.
These conclusions allow us to observe certain tendencies and assumptions in the existing research. First, we need to add variety to EUsoft law research, which has traditionally focused on, and to a certain extent overstated, the role of EUcourts in giving effect to soft law. 61 It is important that the special role of judicial recognition be acknowledged. However, other considerations are equally significant, and soft law research should be pursued in a context of awareness of the multiplicity of incentives and assumptions of regulation. Second, the conclusions of this article should add a critical edge to new governance research, which often assumes that soft law will, by default, promote flexibility and diversity. Indeed, soft law constitutes a potentially legitimate vehicle for shaping European integration in the name of flexibility and diversity.
New governance research can teach us much about legally relevant integration, which takes place through non-binding instruments: it does not take for granted binding legislation or the supremacy doctrine but is instead founded upon persuasive use of non-binding mechanisms, administrative and legal linkages between EUinstitutions and Member States, and the inclusion of non-governmental actors. The values of flexibility and diversity may, however, only be ideals that have informed the adoption of soft law and which are compromised by the institutional and legal practice, which makes a soft law instrument 'the optimal' regulatory model against which Member State activities are measured. 
